ING webinar on the 2027 rates outlook: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
The US 10-year Treasury hitting 6% in 2027 is not as far-fetched as it sounds. AI and productivity, extraordinary fiscal deficits, and stubborn inflation could combine to keep global rates under upward pressure. But which force will ultimately dominate? What could Treasury Secretary Bessent do if yields surge? And what if inflation proves stickier than market expectations suggest? Or is all that overblown, and we land in a less dramatic place? We explore the forces that could drive each scenario.
In the eurozone, the inflation shock may be changing rather than disappearing – is it, and if so, what are the implications? To what extent could second-round inflation pressures, heavy bond supply and rising global real rates complicate the outlook, even if the ECB turns more dovish? Meanwhile, France’s growing debt challenge adds another source of uncertainty for euro sovereign markets. How bad can this get for bond markets and rates? Will bond supply finally test investor appetite?
Join ING experts as we explore the key scenarios for US and euro rates in 2027, and where we think the biggest risks and opportunities lie.
Speakers
Padhraic Garvey, Regional Head of Research, Americas
Michiel Tukker, Senior UK & Eurozone Rates Strategist
Benjamin Schroeder, Senior Rates Strategist
Details
Date: Wednesday, 4 November
Time: 1400 GMT/1500 CET/0900 ET
The webinar will last 45 minutes, including a Q&A session at the end.
The event will take place online and the waiting room will open 60 minutes ahead of the scheduled start time.
A joining link will be emailed following registration and you will receive a reminder email 10 minutes before the scheduled start time.
View transcript
You are all very welcome to the good, the bad and the ugly for rates in 2027. On our side here at ING we have the the unashamed Bond nerds of the research team in the virtual house. I'm Pory Garvey. I'm based here in New York and in London we have Mikael Tucker and in Amsterdam we have Benjamin Schroeder. So we've got we've got all bases covered here as we progress through 2027. Before we get going I just want to say a few words about the the midterms and I'll be brief on this. I think the biggest takeaway from our perspective is that democracy has has worked. There was all kinds of scare stories about stuff going down at polling stations and nothing untoward happened. We had a very clear election outcome and the president didn't even say anything crazy. So I think that's the way I would take it this morning. It is true that the power of the Congress is stymied by the presidential veto which makes it difficult for Congress to get stuff done. And it is true that the the president himself has tariff power that's been granted to him by the legislative branch and he continues to have that. And he's got commander in chief power of course as well. I think from our perspective the tariff power is the most important. It's a double-edged sword because tariffs mean inflation. But tariffs are also a consumption tax tax. And we do need more taxes to sort out the fiscal story. So we'll watch that place very very carefully going forward. But let's move on to 2027. Now we have broken this out into three elements. The good, the bad and the ugly. The ugly is inflation. And we attach a 50% influence to this with a particular emphasis on delivered inflation. The bad is the fiscal. And here you think about the absolute levels of the fiscal deficit and the future dynamics. And there's good as well. I mean the good is the productivity revolution that AI promises. And we think that the deficit and the AI pieces contribute the other 50% to the driver of the long end of the curve. Now you may think that 20% is low from an AI perspective. But bear in mind that we didn't have this a couple of years ago. This is a brand new piece. And what we see here, what we saw here, I should say through 2026 was this idea of productivity growth being linked to higher real yields. It was also an issuance piece. Now when we look at the issuance piece, our viewpoint is that for most of this year, it actually hasn't been a big problem. A bit of a new issue premium in places, but it's mostly been taken down quite well, the long-dated AI issues. As we go into 2027, and we're seeing this at the moment, we expect that to become more of a thing and to cause some heavier pressure in terms of the overall issuance story. Now, let me just put up a chart here of the 10-year treasury yields and set up our theme here. So if you look at the 10-year treasury yields, simplistically what's happened in 2026 is that we've gone from 4% to 5%. The catalyst was the Iran war. So for 2027, if the Iran war goes away, we're going to regard that as being a bit of a bullish impulse. It hasn't gone away so far, and we're going to assume it remains problematic over the next number of months. The other thing that was really interesting in 2026 was Chair Walsh's Jackson Hole speech. Now, I think we had a bias when it came to Chair Walsh because he was given the job by President Trump, and we know what President Trump wants. He wants him to cut rates. But Chair Walsh, in fact, was very clear from his very first FOMC meeting. He wants to achieve price stability. And if I was to summarize what he said at Jackson Hole, it basically was, I am serious. And since then, of course, he's hiked rates. We think the Fed hikes again in December. We're not ruling out another hike in March. That's possible. It's not our central view. And why is that? It's because we've got this inflation narrative that is proving sticky and can prove sticky for longer than is comfortable. And we identify from now until right through the first quarter of 2027 as being the vulnerable period from a bond market perspective. And we, in fact, expect to see the 10-year Treasury yields get back up towards the 5.25% area. We want to explain that. And that's really the big deal with this call. But I have to say, you know, I don't want to emphasize the bullish aspect to our forecast, but as we progress through 2027, we do have that 10-year getting back below 5%. And the big driver there is inflation. We've got taming in energy price inflation. The housing market is pulling down inflation. Wage inflation is quite moderate. We're looking for inflation to be trending towards 2%, 2.5% as we progress through 2027. And that, in our view, brings that 10-year Treasury yield back down to 475, landing in the 450, 475 area. But we are some way before we get to that point. And we want to focus on the more bearish tint that we have here. And at this point, I want to bring Mikael into the picture here. Mikael, of course, is sitting there in London. So, Mikael, let's have a conversation about the good to start off with. So, if you look at 2026, 90% of the rise in the 10-year Treasury yields came from higher rail rates. Really interesting. I link that to productivity. But Mikael, a question for you. Markets, if you look at them, are very optimistic on the value from AI. And in the US, we're seeing that impact in terms of big investments. How do you take AI into account in your outlook for the Eurozone? Yes. Thanks, Boris. So, the economic impact is very different so far from what we've seen happening in the US compared to the Eurozone. If anything, you could say in the US, it's clear there's an investment boom originating from AI-related investments and simply not really visible in the Eurozone. So, from that perspective, this whole idea that the ECB would have to hike because of AI is really far-fetched. And it's really much more about energy story. It's really that inflation second-round effect, fears coming through after oil and gas reaching such high prices and not really focus on that positive growth narrative at the moment. But having said that, rates don't trade in isolation. So, it's one to look at what the impact could be on the ECB, but it's probably more interesting to see what's happening at the long end of the curve. So, looking at 10-year rates, because already, as you mentioned, Pork, right, a lot of action is in the 10-year. Real rates are moving significantly higher, and this is really a global move in higher real 10-year rates. And that is really related to increased borrowing costs because of high issuance, both from governments, but also marginally of that AI effect, adding to that as well. And still the expectation of having that productivity growth story spilling over, not just from a US -centered approach, but also globally. So, it's really, the action is more at the 10-year rates than that we see at the short end of the curve. So, that makes us question, right? Like, how much could rates then still rise if, not our base case, but if AI really does start surprising a lot more and also having more of an impact in the Eurozone? And for that, I like to pop up a chart where I often think about how 10-year rates should be anchored. I often like to think 10-year rates should be in line with nominal growth expectations over the long term. So, what I did here is just a simple chart, nominal growth expectations over the long term as estimated by an economist survey. So, that's the blue line and charting that against the orange line, which is the 10-year Euro swap rate. And what you can see is, before the global financial crisis, usually 10-year swap rates were quite close to these nominal long-term expectations. And more recently, they have returned there. And this is part of the normalization. We're heading out of that secular stagnation. And now you can see 3.3% for the 10-year swap rate. 3.5% is all very, very close to each other. So, what is needed to shift away from that? Well, one of two things. I think either we do need to see more concrete proof that AI's productivity growth will actually start impacting Eurozone growth expectations. I doubt we would see that for 2027. Or second, we also see this cyclical investment upturn arise in the Eurozone. So, what I mean is corporates, not just the big tech based in the US, but also beyond that, start investing in AI to improve their business. But for the moment, what we're seeing, AI is more treated as a cost-cutting exercise, more of an efficiency measure, rather than really triggering a big investment swing. If these two factors, of course, would materialize, then we could easily see another 50 basis points added to 10-year swap rates. But not our base case, but definitely a scenario to keep in mind. Yeah, thanks, Mikhail. Super interesting. So, let me just build on that from a US perspective. By noting that this tech boom that we're seeing right now, it does have an echo from the past. And I've got a really interesting picture here of the 10-year real yield. Now, it's currently at 2.6%. We had been up at pretty close to 3%. But what intrigues me is that if you go back to the 1999-2000 period, the 10-year real yield was up at 4%. And the inflation expectation piece is very similar today to what it was back then. It was 2 point something low twos. So, the big question is, you know, could we get back to a 4% real yield? Because if we did, you would be knocking on the door of a 6% nominal yield for good reasons. This is why we're talking about the good. Now, this is not our central view. And the reason is that if you look back at 1999-2000s, growth was persistently at 3% or 4%. It's not what we're expecting for 2027. We identify the juggernauts like the median consumer is acting as a material drag on growth. So, there are boomy parts of the U.S. economy, but there are also vulnerable parts. So, we're more inclined to think about growth next year as being a 2% thing, maybe 3% from time to time, but a 2% thing. And consequently, we don't have that move back up to 4%. But we're going to watch this space very carefully because that's what could take us higher in yield for good reasons. Now, let's change gear here. Let's take the mood down, sorry, and let's focus on the bad. The bad is the fiscal deficit. And from a U.S. perspective, there's a glass half full narrative here in the sense that the deficit situation has not gotten worse. It's not good. We're looking at a deficit of 6% of GDP and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 100% of GDP. This is not good. But what's interesting for me is that I don't believe this marketplace has had a big, bad bond sell-off. And the reason I say that is because if you look at the 10-year swap spread, it has actually been narrowing. And the swap spread, in many ways, is a credit spread between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 10-year SOFA raise. And that's down at 40 basis points. So, look, there's good and there's bad here. The good is that I don't think we've had a big, bad bond market sell-off in the U.S. at all yet. We had one post-Liberation Day. We had a Sell America theme for a week. But since then, we haven't had it. The swap spread, in fact, is tighter since Scott Besant announced his increased buy-back program, which I think is a vote of positivity. And we haven't seen a France. In France, the swap spread went from 50 to 150. That's what a bond market sell-off looks like. So, again, the other way we could go higher in yield is if the marketplace woke up tomorrow and decided to capitulate sell U.S. Treasuries. We're not calling for that, but we're watching it very carefully. I want to go back to Amsterdam now. Let's bring in Ben. Ben, he loves to talk about bad stuff, especially when it comes to the Eurozone. So, Mr. Bad Ben, deficit concerns are shaping rates on the bond yield outlook. How does that factor into your rates expectations in Europe? So, of course, in Europe, France has been all over the headlines these days under market pressure to consolidate finances. So, we've definitely seen a Sell France. However, fiscal concerns have been a long-running affair in the Eurozone, not just in France. And here in this chart, you can see on the left-hand side, showing IMF data on country debt levels, that the trajectories actually of many of the Eurozone countries have been on a worsening path for some time already. To some degree, markets have already accounted for that. So, we have, for instance, already seen a reordering of what was once this traditional periphery, semi-core, core market segmentation and Eurozone bond markets. But what we are seeing now, of course, is that geopolitical factors with rising energy prices and, of course, the rising interest rates have pushed that issue of public finances to the foreground again. And France is being singled out, of course, as the upcoming presidential elections shroud the outlook in an even greater uncertainty. And in that simplistic chart there on the right, showing 10-year bond spreads versus the IMF long-run debt projection, you can see that France is the clear outlier here. And if you look at this chart, it suggests around some 40 basis points of additional risk premium in the French bond spread. You could argue that looks a bit stretched, but keep in mind, we're still around six months away from that presidential election in France. The leading contender, Marine Le Pen, while vowing to consolidate finances, has not really put forward a credible plan yet. And the public unrest also of the past weeks highlights that any party will struggle to push through meaningful change against public resistance. We also have to contend with tail risks. We have a far left candidate with plans to cancel French debt held at the French central bank. So in terms of spread, we should stay above 150 base points, at least in the first half of next year. And my fear is that it still needs to get worse before things can change and improve. The factors that we keep an eye on is for France, for instance, that there is a large share of foreign investors involved historically. Of course, this is because France was one of the better rated and large liquid markets in the Eurozone, but it's now becoming a liability. There's unfortunately not that much of data to go by to kind of track this in a timely manner. But we do have some monthly data from Japan. And what we do see here is that Japanese investors have been quite sensitive to political risks around past French elections and have reduced their positions here. So this is something that we'll want to look out for. The other thing we're watching is rating agencies. And we have seen Moody's refrain from downgrading France, keeping the rating at AA3. But just last week, we had an unscheduled review from Pitch. And they put a negative outlook on the A-plus rating, highlighting that the pressure here is also still on. To be fair, if you look at the spread of French denier bonds, they already trade on levels much more akin to a BBB credit. So, yeah, apart from spreads, how does this turmoil impact our rates outlook? In the near term markets, of course, they have already dialed down their aggressive pricing of ECB hikes. Higher bond yields, tighten financial conditions. Do some of the ECB's work to contain inflation pressures? Of course, it was not just the bond market turmoil, but also some jitters in the AI tech sector of late. But the domestic factor does play a big role, we think. Now, I have been singling out France a bit here, but let's be clear, it's not just France. There have been headlines of late that Belgium has failed to decide on a budget to consolidate its finances. Markets will face uncertainty around Italy, which also holds election next year. And importantly to point out, at the very opposite end of the spread spectrum, we have Germany, which is facing its very own structural issues. And politics here also look anything but stable. For now, German bonds have benefited from a flight to safety. But if that should fade, they also become more exposed again to the pressure from growing supply and the ECB's quantitative tightening. So potentially, we're looking at 400 billion in gross issuance from Germany. It will become the largest issuer in the Eurozone. And looking then at the 10-year bunds spreads versus the risk-free rates versus SOS, we do think that we should get to 10-year bunds yielding back above 20 basis points over OAS and maybe cheating even beyond that. Great. Thanks for that, Ben. Let's flip back over to London. It's always good to get a sceptic from London on Europe into the conversation. So tell me, Mikhail, what's the ECB going to do about this? Are they going to ignore this or are they going to take action? Yes. So far, they've been able to ignore this. It's really been quite contained to France, not too much contagion. But I think the interesting thing is, what if there is a trade-off between financial stability risk for the ECB and inflation? I think then things can get quite interesting. Because if we look currently how markets are positioned for the inflation story, they're very, very optimistic about the ECB ability to get inflation back to 2%. Different ways of looking at this in forward space, we usually like this. So this is the five-year, five-year inflation swap. So what does this tell us? This tells us how markets are positioned for five-year inflation in five years, really a long-term inflation anchor. The ECB has the mandate. They need to get it at 2%. And indeed, what we see at the moment, markets price that very close to 2%, 2.1%, 2.2%. And what you might also recognize, it didn't really jump higher on oil surging, which is very different, the story, compared to 2022, 2023. When markets did get nervous about the ECB's ability to bring inflation to target. So what does that tell us? That tells us markets see higher inflation coming through from oil. Markets see the ECB tightening significantly because of higher oil. And markets see inflation come back to 2% because of the tightening. But what if financial stability starts getting a concern? And maybe the ECB would have to refrain from hiking too much. In worst case, even start considering cuts as well because of spreads in European government bonds start widening too much. And we start seeing risks mounting in financial sectors. In that case, there could very well be a scenario where inflation toleration increases as well, where the ECB might shift a bit away from its single mandate, not officially, of course, and be willing to be a bit more dovish. And in that case, I think especially five-year, five-year long-term inflation swaps are not really capturing that risk at the moment because that would definitely cause a bit of a steepening in curves where the front end would be dragged lower by a more dovish ECB. But long-term inflation expectations are not so certain about 2% being the almighty target. So hopefully we won't see this, but let's keep it in mind. Yeah, great. Thanks. Thanks, Miguel. So just very briefly back to you, Ben, maybe a quick comment on what the ECB could do here. So, yeah, I mean, if the ECB wanted to intervene in this bond market, we've often described it more as a cascade of measures that the ECB could take of gradually more forceful. The ECB would likely begin with just adjusting communication, then even maybe monetary policy, and moving then only to direct intervention if French bond market dynamics were to become disorderly or to spread across the broader Eurozone bond market. So first response, acknowledge that higher bond yields are already tightening financial conditions, thereby reducing the need for further policy rate hikes, for instance. They can be more or less explicit about this, but I think we've already seen a bit of the first moves in that direction. At some point, the ECB could, of course, make a more stronger worded statement that it is monitoring the monetary policy transmission and is prepared to step in to kind of act against that unwarranted fragmentation. This could already temper some of the widening without purchasing anything. The ECB has this very powerful tool in the backdrop, the transmission protection instrument, in short, TPI. The only caveat is that it would require some cooperation from France, as this tool is conditioned on the government being in compliance with the EU fiscal framework. So we do think that an intermediate operational step that the ECB could take first after verbal intervention is to suspend or slow QT, reinvest the proceeds from maturing securities and potentially reinvest those in a flexible manner. This would remove some duration risk from the market and signal that the ECB no longer wants the balance sheet reduction to reinforce the tightening of conditions. The TPI is the clearest anti-fragmentation tool that the ECB has. It allows purchases without any pre-announced ex-ante limits. However, it does set the bar quite high for the TPI. So if we look at the bond spreads back in 2011, 2012, French spreads now have already been quite close to where they have been back then in recent weeks. So just below 200 basis points versus 10-year bonds. But the ECB back in 2011, 2012 did not intervene because of France, but it intervened because of the periphery markets. And here we had Italian 10-year spreads over bonds above 500 basis points. So I'm not saying that we need to get there before anything happens, but it still highlights that the bar is very high for the ECB to step in. So it might want to let the market forces out to play first, as it doesn't want to create any impression of creating a moral hazard by intervening too early in the market. So again, yes, it might still have to get worse before it can get better. Whether it gets as worse as it was back in 2012, we have to also acknowledge that the eurozone that we have today is quite a different one from 2012. So we've also had some improvements along the way to make it a bit more resilient. Yeah, thanks, Ben. I think that's enough of the bad for today. Let's move on to the ugly. What's the ugly? The ugly is inflation. And part of the reason it's ugly is because it was raised, it was elevated really because of the wars, which, of course, are ugly. So let me show you a very simple chart here, a chart of U.S. inflation. Before the war, U.S. inflation was up 2 percent, 2.5 percent. As a consequence of the war and the elevation in energy prices, U.S. inflation went up to 4.2 percent. Now it's come back down to 3.7. But the fact remains that this is a very uncomfortable position for the Fed to finance itself here. Now, as stated, we think inflation falls over the course of 2027. But we have to accept that the war rages on. There is El Nino. That's a thing for food prices. Parts of the economy are booming. Health costs are rocketing in many cases. The list goes on. So Treasuries have got no choice but to be really cognizant of the inflation risks. And it's one of the reasons to why I'm still quite nervous on the U.S. Treasury market impulse. But let me bring Mikhail back in here for a view on the Eurozone inflation dynamic. What do you think, Mikhail? What's your view on this? Yeah, so our view is still for a bit of a benign outcome on the inflation side. But it's going to be quite a difficult balance as well. We still won't know really what the second round effects are until we have a lot more data. And I think one thing we've seen in markets is that rotation away from following oil blindly to really waiting for other data points to come in. So for most of this year, I could just open up my laptop, look where oil was, and I could tell you this is where the two -year swap rate is going to be trading today. That's not the case anymore, especially the last few weeks. There's been also more focus on AI jitters, more focus on politics. So that means right now what we need is more inflation data before we can really get rid of the ugly in this story. And that's why we work with scenarios, because no one can perfectly predict inflation. But we have three scenarios. We have our baseline. Baseline would be inflation effects eventually coming down, especially by mid-2027. That really helps rates lower. But there's also a persistent inflation scenario. Right now, I feel that the balance of risk is towards markets overreacting to an upside surprise. On the inflation front, we could just have one or two readings, which are a bit hotter than expected. And before you know it, markets will pick up their playbook from 2022, when inflation actually started converging towards 10%. Not what we're expecting. Wage growth especially is unlikely to really pass through that much. But especially wage growth is something that really comes through with a significant lag. So that means the coming months, we could expect quite volatile markets. All the way probably until mid-2027, higher data, but also energy prices still not settled lower, could create quite a bit of anxiety in there with big swings up and down on the rate side. What else is there to watch? So also growth is another factor in this inflation story. We've really been surprised by how resilient growth has been over the past year or so. So it's also, despite the energy, despite the geopolitical risks, Eurozone economy has done well, better than expected. And if that really keeps on giving or even improving further, that of itself is also an inflationary factor for the ECB to consider. And then you also start thinking, where should the neutral rates be? What should be the terminal point? And that also relates a bit maybe to AI. Maybe AI, going back the full loop to the start, the good, is AI finally starting to spill over to the Eurozone, also starting to add to the growth story from an investment perspective. So actually a bit more on the inflationary side or not. So plenty of things to worry about. But I think eventually we tilt the view by the end of 2027, we could actually be looking at an ECB cut after one more hike later this year. So overall, I do like to take a glass half full look at this. Yeah, thanks, Mikhail. So let's try to land this thing at this point and come to some conclusions for the US and for the Eurozone. So let me frame this through the prism of the US, but be aware that the same kind of rhythm obtains for the Eurozone. So first and foremost, the good, the bad and the ugly has a negative tinge to it. And we're anticipating upside pressure on bond yields over the next number of months through the first quarter of 2027. We're bearish in bonds for that reason in the immediate few months. But as we go through 2027, 50% of the derivation of long end yields is inflation. And we expect inflation to fall. And as inflation falls, it means the central banks have to worry less about hiking rates. The marketplace then begins to discount rate cuts. And that brings the 10-year treasury yields below 5%, down to 475, probably settling at 450, 475, which is still above normal. I want to leave you with two charts, one on the US. First one is on the SOFR discount, the forward profile. I find this an intriguing chart. What it shows is that the market anticipates at least two hikes from the Fed, maybe three, two for sure. That's fine. Maybe that's what happens. But what's really interesting about this chart is that it discounts that the Fed never really cuts in the future. And that's where we have an issue. If we're going to get bullish later on in 2027, it is that this marketplace needs to start to discount rate cuts. If we're right about inflation coming down. And that's the genesis for us being more constructive on bonds as we go through 2027. Same story for the eurozone. Same story. There's a picture here of the one-month ESTA rate. And again, what does the market discount? The market discounts that the ECB goes to 3% and basically stays there. We find that unlikely as an outcome for 2027. So we're bearish, but we do see a silver lining down the line. So let me conclude at this point on this part of the setup. And, yeah, I can't see the questions. Can you see the questions, guys? Can't kick that. Yeah, I see the questions, Porik. I think one is for you, Porik. Do you think American economy can handle higher rates? Not AI-related segments are not so boomy. Do you expect this K-shaped story influencing rate markets? Yes. So, you know, this reminds me of a conversation I had with the head of credit trading a few years back when we were at zero for the Fed funds rate. He said to me, look, and he's left IG since, so I can say this, but he said to me, this market will not be able to take a Fed funds rate of 3%. Now, not only did we get to 3%, but we got to over 5%. And we've seen the 10-year at over 5% as well. I think there's a degree of resilience there with respect to the elevation in rates. I think, I mean, the story we painted was one where we get to five and a quarter, maybe five and a half. We've been there. We've been there only a few months ago. Now, is that positive for the economy? Does that make things more difficult? Yes, it does. But is it catastrophic? No, it isn't. Especially if we get there for good reasons. So, I would suggest that if rates are high because of a strong economy, we shouldn't worry too much about that. If rates are high because the market begins to capitulate sell treasuries because they don't like the smell of the fiscal deficit, okay, that's a whole different dynamic. So, it kind of depends on how we get there. But at the moment, the tolerance is quite impressive, in fact, in terms of the ability to contain pressure coming from higher rates. Keep going there, Mikael, if there's more questions. I can't see the screen. Next. Okay, the next question I have. I have it for Ben. About Eurozone rates. You have mentioned budget woes as main drivers of credit risk premium for France, Belgium, Italy, etc. Don't you think that political risk of anti-EU far-right parties, think AFD, Le Pen, taking power is also a driver for higher premiums for that market? Should it be? Yeah, it's a good question. And I think it should be. And I do think it actually is. I mean, not in the sense that these parties are now seriously contemplating leaving the euro or the monetary union at this stage. But there's clearly ways in how the union is kind of weakened in other ways. So, let's take France. I mean, Le Pen, she campaigned on a Frexit platform back in 2017, which kind of created all these jitters in bond markets back then. What we've seen since then is actually a country can benefit quite neatly from being in the eurozone in the EU. I mean, the example is Italy, which has also had or got a far-right government with Meloni. But then actually kind of changed its tack a bit and saw the benefits of being in that union. And the benefits coming, of course, from the huge transfers of the NGEU after COVID. But, yeah, how does it weaken the union? I mean, if you look at Le Pen and what she's planned in as savings to consolidate the budget, there's clearly things in there like cutting down on budget contributions for the EU that will bring her on a confrontational course with the EU. So, this is clearly also something that could drive the premiums. But it's also the entire election schedule for the broader, wider union over the coming year that could kind of make it a bit of a lost year in terms of political progress. So, we have also elections in Poland as one of the large bits in the EU forming like political direction. And also other countries are seeing elections, Finland, for instance. So, there's a lot of political uncertainty that could kind of slow down political progress. And that also means that those risk premiums might come a bit under pressure from that direction as well. But in terms of far right, really actively seeking to exit the eurozone, I think that is not exactly what's in their plans at the moment. Yeah, I can see my screen again. And I'm just going to just finish off answering that question that I didn't quite see there to begin with. It's a very interesting question about the case-shaped economy. Does that, you know, to what extent does that impact our view on rates? Now, to be perfectly frank here, it doesn't. It really doesn't. Because the median consumer is not very happy, of course. And you see that in surveys. You look at a survey and every respondent has one vote. And what you find then is that the median responder is in a bad place. But aggregate consumer spending is holding up. So, the average consumer is doing okay. And the fact remains that if you look at any economy, and the same goes with the eurozone. The eurozone has a spectrum of growth stories from boomy to non-boomy. And the marketplace and central banks will look at the average. They will look at the totals. So, the case-shaped economy is very important in terms of deciding, you know, what the impulses might be into the future. But in general, we're going to look at the aggregate. So, yeah, interesting narrative. We're not going to really have a determinative effect on the rates outlook. It's all about the aggregates. So, I think we've got time for one more question then. What do you think, Park? Go for it, Mikhail. Take your pick there. I'm seeing, I remember, Ben, you've been doing some work on this. The question is, given that Italian banks are a big holder of BTP, so Italian government bonds, but the French bonds banks, the French banks don't hold as much French government bonds. Is there room for them to do so and bring the yield down? And maybe you could also, because I remember you also looked at foreign holdings for both. Any interesting insights on that regard? Yes. I mean, there's clearly a huge foreign holder segment in France. And if you compare that to Italy, they've got a much more domestic focus. And I think Italy was right to kind of go down that road to shield it from perhaps a more volatile foreign holding position and more sticky domestic investor position. And they did this by going down the road of issuing much more retail focused issuance. Look at the BTP Italia, BTP Valor and all these instruments that they've created to tap into the domestic retail segment as well. And to kind of focus away from that foreign holdings. But yeah, I mean, there is a room for basically the domestic investor, not just banks, but also perhaps the retail investor to kind of pick up some of the slack. If the foreigner should kind of retreat out of these markets. But I mean, France is still one of the large, liquid, deep markets in the Eurozone. And I think it will be hard to ignore France going forward. But once I think this whole political uncertainty dies down and we get some semblance of commitment to consolidate finances, I'm not talking so much about the speed of how fast that goes, but just kind of first steps in the right direction. I think then we'll see investors step back in and bring down those spreads gradually. Great. Thanks. Thanks, Ben. And I think we're going to land this thing at this point, bring this thing to a close. The French piece is really interesting. I've often said that there would be no EMU without France. I firmly believe that. I firmly believe the French coaxed the Germans into giving up the Deutsche Mark. So it's a big deal what's happening in France. But let's sort of draw this thing to a close. I'd like to thank everyone. First of all, thank our speakers, Mikhail and Ben. I'll thank myself, too. And thank you all for joining. And I'm happy to take questions separately. Have a great rest of your day.